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NOAH D. LICHTENSTEIN*

The Hanford Nuclear Waste Site: A
Legacy of Risk, Cost, and Inefficiency
ABSTRACT
Since the cessation of plutonium production in 1987, the Hanford
Nuclear Waste facility has been the site of the largest and most
expensive environmental cleanup project in history. Without
prior knowledge of the dangers associated with chemical and
radiological wastes, the Department of Energy disposed of
millions of gallons of these wastes directly into the soil and the
nearby Columbia River. Faced with this enormous burden, the
federal government has adopted a new cleanup strategy to
accelerate the remediation process and reduce excess spending.
However, critics argue that these efforts jeopardized both personal
and environmental safety, and the federal and local governments
have often been locked in dispute over the proper course of
cleanup action to pursue. The result of these conflicting interests
has been the most expensive and arguably most inefficient
cleanup project in environmentalhistory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will spend over $2
billion1 to remediate the Hanford nuclear reservation-the nation's
largest existing federal nuclear waste storage site. 2 Located in
southeastern Washington State, the Hanford site served as one of the
nation's dumpsters for radioactive materials produced during the
Manhattan Project and throughout the nuclear arms race that
accompanied the ensuing Cold War. 3 With limited knowledge of the
dangers associated with radioactive waste, DOE officials at Hanford
disposed of millions of gallons of highly radioactive materials directly
into the soil. 4 Today, large quantities of these radioactive substances
* Class of 2004, B.A., Stanford University; Legislative Intern, Senator Ron Wyden
(Sept.-Dec. 2003). The author would like to thank Robert Budnitz, Jesse Lichtenstein, and
Armin Rosencranz for their support and help with this manuscript.

1. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUB. No. RL-2002-47 REV. D, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
PLAN FOR THE ACCELERATED CLEANUP OF THE HANFORD SITE, B-2 (Aug. 2002), available at

http://www.hanford.gov/docs/hpmp/index.html (last visited Apr. 24,2004).
2. See C. Wu, Radiation Helps Break Down Toxic Waste, 155 SCi. NEWS 229 (1999).
3. Id. at3.
4. Id. at4.
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have been detected in the ground water beneath the site, contaminating
the water that feeds the Columbia River. 5 Faced with this enormous
threat to personal and environmental safety, the federal government is
now struggling with financing and implementing the estimated 50-year,
$60 billion remediation plan-the largest and most expensive environ6
mental cleanup project in history.
Amidst a myriad of political, economic, and environmental
challenges that accompany the cleanup effort, the federal government is
struggling to appropriate funds in a manner that both provides a
reasonable reduction of personal and environmental risk and remains
economically feasible. This article provides a history of the Hanford
legacy, an analysis of the DOE's accelerated cleanup and long-term
stewardship initiatives, and the specific risks and costs associated with
remediation. I will argue that external oversight of DOE practices is
necessary to ensure a safe and effective cleanup, and that the primary
causes for the project's high degree of inefficiency are DOE
mismanagement and the existence of a conflict in cleanup incentives
between the local and federal government.
II. BACKGROUND
The Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford site is a 560-squaremile nuclear reservation located in southeastern Washington state, 35
miles north of the Oregon border. The Columbia River flows through the
northern portion of the site and forms much of its eastern boundary (see
Appendix, Figure 1). Approximately 175,000 people live directly downstream, centered in and around the cities of Kennewick, Pasco, and
Richland, and the site is located 215 miles upstream from Portland,
Oregon. Chosen in 1943 by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the
Manhattan Project, the Hanford site was used to produce plutonium for
the world's first nuclear weapons. 7 Between 1944 and 1987, Hanford
continually expanded its operations and came to play a pivotal role in
the nation's defense, accounting for approximately 74 tons of plutonium
for the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal (which is almost two-thirds of the
total plutonium production for use by the federal government). 8
Furthermore, the DOE estimates that past practices at Hanford are

5.
6.

Id. at3.
Id. at B-2.

7. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., PUB. NO. RCED-98-80, NUCLEAR WASTE: UNDERSTANDING OF
WASTE MIGRATION AT HANFORD IS INADEQUATE FOR KEY DECISIONS 4 (Mar. 1998), available

at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gaoreports/advanced.html
8.

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 3.

(last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
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responsible for approximately 40 percent of the total human-made
radioactivity across the entire former defense nuclear weapons complex
in the United States, or 400 million of the total one billion curies 9 of
radioactivity produced10
During its years of production, the Hanford site was divided
into several areas of operation (see Appendix, Figure 2). The four
operational districts that are most relevant to this analysis are the 100
Areas, 200 East and 200 West, the 1100 Areas, and the 300 Area, as they
are the four distinct regions of Hanford listed on the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) National Priorities List (NPL) of Superfund
sites.11 The 100 Areas, which are located immediately adjacent to the
Columbia River, contain Hanford's nine decommissioned (though yet to
be decontaminated) reactors, while the 200 East and 200 West sites house
Hanford's chemical separations facilities and the underground tank
farms 12 used to store waste. 13 The 1100 Area was the center of Hanford's
support services, including maintenance facilities and vehicle service
stations, and the 300 Area was primarily used to conduct fuel fabrication
operations and other research and development activities. 14
III. CLEANUP CHALLENGES
During the course of the Hanford site's nearly 50 years of
production, separation, and purification of plutonium for the nation's
nuclear weapons, the DOE estimates that the Hanford site produced
approximately 450 billion gallons of liquid waste. 15 The vast majority of
this waste - estimated to be as much as 350 billion gallons - was released
directly into the ground (in the 200 Areas) through about 300 cribs, 16
9. The curie is a unit of radioactivity that corresponds to 3.7x10 10 disintegrations per
second. By comparison, approximately 20 curies of radioactivity were released during the
1979 Three Mile Island incident. Chet Raymo, Can We Make Amends?, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
23, 1998, at E2, availableat http://www.boston.com/globe/search/stories/health/sciencemusings/112398.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
10.
11.

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 3.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST SITES IN WASHINGTON,

available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/wa.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
12. The DOE uses the term "tank farm" in reference to the physical grouping of
storage tanks at Hanford into clusters. See FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, HANFORD SITE TANK

FARM, at http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/doe-hanfordtank_01.htm
2004).
13. Id.
14.

(last visited Apr. 24,

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, HANFORD SITE TouRs, at http://www.hanford.gov/tours/

virtual.cfm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
15.

U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., supra note 7.

16. A crib is an underground structure designed to allow liquid wastes to percolate to
the soil.
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ponds, and unlined trenches, while liquid wastes of varying levels of
17
contamination were often pumped directly into the Columbia River.
Undoubtedly, the single greatest environmental risk posed by the
Hanford site is the contamination of the Columbia River, which, as
outlined in part II, runs through 51 miles of the site and forms much of
its eastern border. With an estimated 500,000 people locally relying on
clean water from the Columbia for drinking, fishing, agriculture, and
recreation, and with Oregon residents downstream also dependent on
the river for power generation, irrigation, and transport, preventing
8
contamination of the river is paramount.' Studies show that these waste
releases, though having met then-existing disposal standards, have led to
the chemical and radiological contamination, exceeding current
standards, of about 270 billion gallons of ground water spread over 80
19
square miles beneath the site. Additionally, millions of tons of soil
adjacent to the Columbia River have also been contaminated by these
waste releases. 20
In addition to these releases directly into the soil and ground
water, the DOE is currently storing approximately 54 million gallons of
2
the most radioactive and hazardous waste ' in 177 underground tanks
(see Appendix, Figure 3), which have been arranged into 18 farms,
located in the 200 Areas. 22 Many of these storage tanks were built in the
23
1940s to 1960s and have far exceeded their design life of 10 to 40 years.
Hanford's inventory of tanks includes 149 single-shell and 28 doubleshell containers, 24 and, according to DOE reports, 67 single-shell tanks

17. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 3.
18. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, Radioactive Waste Tank Expert Panel to Meet
Late June; Hanford Site Panel Will Review and Analyze Draft Contamination Report (June
8,1998), available at http://www.hanford.gov/press/1998/98-059.htm (last visited Apr. 24,
2004).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 3.
20. Id.
21. The waste in these tanks contributes about 215 million curies to Hanford's
inventory of high-level waste. See RICHLAND OPERATIONS OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,

PUB. No. RL/REG-99-20 REV. 1, Preface to REVIEW GUIDANCE FOR THE REVISED STANDARDS
APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION (Jan. 2000), available at http://
2
www.hanford.gov/osr/documents/reg-99- 0.htl (last visited Apr. 24,2004).
22. CH2MHILL -Hanford Group, Inc., PUB. NO. HNF-EP-0182, Rev. 186, Waste Tank
Summary Report for Month Ending September 30, 2003 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter Waste Tank
Summary Report].
23. U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., PuB. No. GAO-03-593, NUCLEAR WASTE: CHALLENGES TO
ACHIEVING POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN DOE'S HIGH-LEVEL WASTE CLEANUP PROGRAM 6 (June

2003), availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03593.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
24. The terms "single-shell" and "double-shell" refer to the number of layers of carbon
steel encased inside a concrete outer wall.
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have leaked over one million gallons of highly radioactive wastes. 25 The
DOE acknowledges that these wastes have migrated through the vadose
zone, 26 contaminating the ground water that feeds into the Columbia
River. These wastes include chromium, nitrates, trichloroethylene,
carbon tetrachloride, tritium, technetium-99, uranium, and strontium-90,
some of which can remain radioactive for hundreds of thousands of
years. 27
Another primary challenge for the DOE is the approximately 12
tons of plutonium in various separated forms contained in spent nuclear
fuel at the K-Reactor Basins (K-Basins). The K-Basins are huge indoor
pools that currently house approximately 2300 tons of spent nuclear
fuel-80 percent of the remaining irradiated uranium fuel in the DOE's
inventory-that was abandoned when fuel reprocessing was halted in
1987.28 Aside from simply housing some of the most hazardous wastes at
Hanford, the K-Basins present a particularly difficult challenge, as they
are located adjacent to the Columbia River. The proximity of the KBasins to the Columbia is particularly unsafe, as an earthquake or other
such disaster could potentially crack the pools open, spilling radioactive
materials into the water. 29 The effects of a major contamination release
into the Columbia River would be devastating; if the waters were to
become contaminated, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to retrieve or intercept the contaminants.
IV. REMEDIATION AND THE ACCELERATED CLEANUP
Since the cessation of plutonium production in 1987, the
Hanford site has become engaged in the world's largest environmental
cleanup program, 30 aimed to rectify the DOE's past mistakes. However,
with the completion of the cleanup mission slated for 2070, and with
projected costs spiraling to $90 billion, on March 5, 2002, the DOE signed
a "Letter of Intent" with the Washington State Department of Ecology
25. U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., supra note 23; see also Waste Tank Summary Report, supra
note 22.
26. The vadose zone is the area above the water table, comprised of soil and rocks, that
DOE incorrectly assumed would be a sufficient barrier to hazardous wastes reaching the
ground water.
27. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1.
28. Id.
29. While it is unclear whether or not the K-Basins were specifically designed to
withstand such a catastrophe, the general trend at Hanford has shown that long-term
planning was not adequately considered in the construction of other facilities, such as with
the deterioration of storage tanks.
30.

BECHTEL CORP., HANFORD'S ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM, available at

http://www.bechtel.com/ppHanford.htm (last visited Oct. 5,2004).
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(Ecology) and the EPA to cooperatively develop approaches to accelerate
cleanup of the Hanford site. As a result of this agreement, in August 2002
the DOE submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a
comprehensive PerformanceManagement Plan for the Accelerated Cleanup of
31
the Hanford Site (Performance Management Plan), endorsed by Ecology
and the EPA to expedite the slow-moving, high-priced remediation.
Targeting specific areas in need of improvement, the DOE's Performance
Management Plan states, "We believe we can accelerate the completion of
the...cleanup mission from 2070 to 2035, and possibly to 2025, by
reducing excess conservatism, substantively changing our technical
strategy and management approach, and making new front-end
investments." 32 By pursuing these objectives, the DOE believes that it can
eliminate at least 35 years and $30 billion 33and restore over 500 square
miles more of the active portions of the site.
According to its PerformanceManagement Plan, the DOE's current
cleanup efforts are now focused on three primary outcomes: (1) restoring
the Columbia River corridor for other uses, (2) transitioning the Central
Plateau - a raised section of the 200 Areas - to long-term waste treatment
34
and storage, and (3) preparing for the future. In order to attain these
goals -and to combat the cleanup challenges discussed in section IIIthe DOE has developed six strategic initiatives that "accelerate cleanup,
35
reduce risk, and put [the DOE] on the path to completion by 2035." The
following is a brief summary of the DOE's Strategic Initiatives:
1. Restoring the Columbia River Corridor by reducing risk
to the river and shrinking Hanford site operations.
2. Taking near-term actions to ensure that the tank waste
program ends by 2033 with closure of the double-shell tank
farms.
3. Accelerating the cleanup of the K-Basins, stabilization of
remaining plutonium, and demolition of the Plutonium
Finishing Plant. Also, evaluating the benefits of moving
high-radiation-level cesium and strontium capsules to
secure dry storage.

31.

U.S. DEr'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1.

32. Id. at l.
33. These savings estimates have since been amended. One 2003 DOE estimate lists
savings at $14.5 billion. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 23.
34.

U.S. DEW'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1.

35.

Id. at ii.
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4. Accelerating treatment and disposal of mixed low-level
waste and retrieval and shipment of transuranic waste
offsite ahead of current plans.
5. Using grouping strategies to clean up the Central
Plateau's excess waste facilities and non-tank-farm waste
sites.
6. Protecting groundwater by removing or isolating
important contaminant sources on the Central Plateau,
remediating the contamination sources exterior to the
Central Plateau core zone, reducing the conditions that
have the potential to drive contaminants into the
groundwater, treating the ground water, and integrating all
site monitoring requirements. 36
The DOE believes that by moving all low-level wastes to be
stored at Hanford to the Central Plateau in the 200 Areas, it can reopen
over 85 percent of the site to unrestricted uses in the long run. Some of
these uses include restoration of Native American ceremonial sites, 37 the
development of a regional transportation and industrial center in the
1100 Area, and the utilization of Hanford's natural resources such as
minerals, natural gas, and prehistoric archeological sites. 38
V. LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP
In accordance with its acceleration of the Hanford cleanup, the
DOE is currently developing guidelines that will define the future
landscape of the Hanford site after the remediation process is complete.
The DOE developed the Hanford Long-Term Stewardship Program
(LTS) with the stated purpose, as defined in its mission statement, of
"[providing] for continuous human and environmental protection, and
the conservation and consideration of use of the biological, natural, and
cultural resources, both during and following the completion of the
cleanup mission."39 In particular, "long-term stewardship" at Hanford
consists of three elements: management of risk, management of site
36.
37.
2003).

Id.
Telephone Interview with Mike Wilson, Washington Dep't of Ecology (Dec. 29,

38. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, HANFORD LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM: INTEGRATING ACcELERATED SITE CLEANUP COMPLETION WITH LONG-RANGE POST-CLEANUP

PLANNING, Doc. No. HNF-12254 REV A WORKING DRAFT (Sept. 2002), available at www.
hanford.gov/docs/hnf-12254/HNF-12254.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
39. Id.
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resources, and reuse. The first element - the management of risks - refers
to human health, ecological, and cultural risks associated with any
remaining contamination that will exist after remediation is complete.
The second element - management of site resources - refers to Hanford's
cultural, biological, and natural resources, many of which have been set
aside and protected for nearly 60 years as a result of the site's existence.
Finally, the third element - reuse - refers to the reuse of the site's assets,
personnel are no longer
as land, facilities, technologies, and skilled
40
missions.
Hanford
necessary to support
While the LTS Program focuses on reuse and the management of
risks and site resources as described above, one purpose of developing
the LTS Program now is that it allows the DOE to define and implement
a program that will enable it to prepare for and satisfy (or transfer, as
appropriate) its post-cleanup obligations when they arise. These
obligations include the management of residual contamination that will
caps, 41
remain below soil covers, disposal sites covered by engineered
and the significant amount of contaminated ground water that will
42
persist after remediation is complete. Though the surface footprint of
Hanford will shrink considerably, at the conclusion of the cleanup
program, residual contamination will undoubtedly remain. It is in these
areas that the success of the LTS Program is critical to ensure that the
goals established in its mission statement are achieved.
VI. CLEANUP AUTHORITIES AND THE TRI-PARTY AGREEMENT
While the DOE is responsible for administering the closure of
Hanford, multiple federal and state authorities govern the cleanup of
environmental contamination and the management of radioactive and
hazardous wastes at the site. The authority that applies to a specific
action determines whether the federal government or43the state is
responsible for overseeing the action to ensure compliance.
The primary statute that applies to the cleanup of past
contamination at Hanford-and especially those areas placed on the
EPA's National Priorities List-is the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA,

40. Id.
41. Caps are engineered ecological structures that cover contaminated areas and
prevent contaminants from reaching the surface.
42. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 38.
43. Memorandum to Sen. Ron Wyden, Environmental Cleanup at the Hanford Nuclear
Facility (Nov. 25, 2003).
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commonly referred to as Superfund). 44 While the EPA typically leads the
oversight of response actions taken under CERCLA, the DOE
implements the actions itself through use of private contractors. 45 In
addition to CERCLA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA)46 also applies to cleanup of past contamination. However,
the RCRA specifically applies to areas in which waste disposal facilities
have been operated, or are operating, with permits issued under that
statute. As is common in many other states, the EPA has delegated its
oversight of RCRA cleanup actions -including those taken at Hanford to the State of Washington, to be administered by the Washington
Department of Ecology. Furthermore, this Department oversees
compliance at Hanford with other applicable state regulations, 47 such as
the Washington Hazardous Waste Management Act. 48 Lastly, while the
DOE is in charge of implementing the cleanup under the regulatory
regime described above, it is also subject to requirements for the
management of radioactive materials under the Atomic Energy Act of
1954.49

In order to specify the requirements that the DOE must satisfy in
order to achieve compliance with the applicable regulatory regime, the
DOE, the EPA, and the Washington State Department of Ecology signed
the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order o on May 15,
1989, commonly referred to as the Tri-Party Agreement (TPA). The
primary objectives of the TPA are achieving compliance with CERCLA's
remedial action provisions, and with RCRA's treatment, storage, and
disposal unit regulations, and corrective action provisions. 51
Furthermore, the TPA establishes legally binding deadlines for the
completion of specific actions, defines and ranks cleanup commitments,
and provides the basis for aggressively achieving full regulatory
compliance and remediation.5 2
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). See especially 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (2000) (making federal
agencies subject to CERCLA to the same degree as private entities).
45. For a list of the major contractors and the actions they perform, refer to DOE's
Hanford website at http://www.hanford.gov/top/whowho.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2004).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994). See especially 42 U.S.C. 6961 (1994) (making federal
agencies subject to RCRA to the same degree as private entities).
47. Telephone Interview with Mike Wilson, supra note 37.
48. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.105 (West 2004).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2097 (1996).
50. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. EPA & WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, HANFORD
FEDERAL FACILITY AGREEMENT AND CONSENT ORDER 89-10 (as amended through Sept.

2003), available at http://www.hanford.gov/tpa/coverpg.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Because it is a legally binding agreement, any alterations to the
TPA allowing different response actions to be taken, or that would alter
the time frame for the completion of remediation, must be negotiated
among all three parties. However, given the complexity of the cleanup
effort, the TPA is revised periodically in response to improved
remediation technologies or threats of exposure. As a result, the TPA is a
"living" document.
In order to accomplish its stated objectives, the TPA uses its
power to delegate remediation responsibilities at the Hanford site. The
assignment of cleanup tasks is primarily divided among three
organizations within the DOE's Richland Operations Office: (1) the Tank
Waste Remediation System (TWRS) project office is responsible for
managing and cleaning up the single- and double-shell tanks; (2) the
Environmental Restoration unit is responsible for cleaning up closed
facilities and the vadose zone, which is under the hundreds of inactive
liquid waste facilities such as ponds, trenches, and cribs; and (3) the
Waste Management unit is responsible for stored and newly generated
wastes, along with related operational facilities. In charge of directing
is the DOE's
and implementing policy for these three organizations
53
Management.
Environmental
Assistant Secretary for
VII. MILESTONES
While the DOE has remediation efforts slated for completion by
2035, several key milestones are scheduled to occur much sooner. These
benchmarks include the TWRS's first tank waste retrieval and closure
demonstration in 2004 (and the closing of all remaining tanks by 2033);
the complete removal of K-Basin spent nuclear fuel, sludge, debris, and
water by 2006; and the completion of the Columbia River Corridor
cleanup by 2012.54 However, while the purpose of these new milestones
is to expedite the cleanup process, the TPA has repeatedly been
hampered in past remediation efforts due to technically flawed,
impractical, and mistaken original provisions that led to frequent
amendment and renegotiation. As a result, the TPA has failed to fulfill a
number of its legally binding commitments.
For example, one of the TPA's most important milestones -the
commencement of waste retrieval from single-shell tanks by 1997-was
plagued by criticism of its planned waste transfer methods (the local
government felt the practice was unsafe for workers and presented an
unacceptable environmental risk). These criticisms halted the waste
53.
54.

See generally U.S. GEN. Acer. OFF., supra note 23.
For a more comprehensive list of DOE milestones, see Appendix, Table 1 infra.
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transfer process, prompted the conducting of numerous new safety
studies, added to the total cost of remediation, and set off a spiral of
delays and missed TPA milestones. 55 As a result of such conflicts, many
of these "enforceable milestones" have proven not to be as enforceable as
the TPA suggests.
VIII. LEGAL AND TECHNICAL CHALLENGES TO ACCELERATED
REMEDIATION
While the purpose of the accelerated cleanup plan for Hanford is
to reduce costs and shorten the length of the remediation process, many
of the methods used by the DOE to attain these goals raise a host of legal
and technical challenges. The most controversial aspect of the accelerated
plan involves the DOE's belief that it has the regulatory authority to
reclassify high-level wastes at Hanford as "low-level" or "incidental"
waste. In 1999, the DOE issued an internal policy on the reclassification
of high-level wastes at Hanford - Order 435.1 - calling for the separation
of the existing wastes into two main streams. 56 One stream, the highlevel portion, will contain 90 percent of the radioactivity, but only a
small portion of the waste volume; the other stream, the low-level
portion, will contain less than ten percent of the total radioactivity, but
the vast majority of the waste volume.
Once separated, the DOE plans to treat each waste stream
according to its level of radioactivity, whereas previously all wastes at
Hanford were subject to "high-level" waste regulations. 57 After
separation, the DOE plans to permanently dispose of the high-level
portion of the separated waste in a geologic repository developed
pursuant to requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.58 The
remaining low-level portion would be immobilized and permanently
stored on site.59
The primary legal challenge to the DOE's accelerated plan has
been centered on the DOE's authority to make these waste
reclassification determinations. In March 2002, the Natural Resources
55. Further analysis of poor project management and planning practices will be
provided in Part VIII infra.
56.

See generally U.S. DOE, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT MANUAL, M 435.1-1

(July 9, 1999), available at http://w-ww.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/neword/
435/m4351-1c1.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2004); U.S. DOE, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR DOE
M 435.1-1, G 435.1-1 (July 9, 1999), available at http://www.directives.doe.gov/cgi-bin/
explhcgi?qry1850731058;doe-184 (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
57. See generally U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., supra note 23.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-10,270 (2000).
59. U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., supra note 23.
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Defense Council (NRDC) filed a lawsuit challenging the DOE's authority
to manage its wastes through the incidental waste process, and claimed
that the DOE violated the Nuclear Waste Policy Act by promulgating
60
Order 435.1. In NRDC v. Abraham, the NRDC argued that the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act defines all wastes originating from the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel as high-level waste and requires that such wastes be
61
managed in accordance with high-level waste regulations. The U.S.
District Court for Idaho ruled that the DOE violated the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act by differentiating its wastes according to level of
radioactivity. This decision dealt a major setback to the DOE's
62
accelerated remediation plan. Following the recommendations of the
General Accounting Office (GAO), the Secretary of Energy has since
requested that Congress enact legislation clarifying DOE authority in
determinations on waste incidental to reprocessing at the Hanford and
other DOE sites. 63
The DOE's acceleration initiative also faces key technical
challenges regarding the physical process used to separate the various
components of the waste. Waste separation is an extremely complex
process to begin with, involving a sequential procedure of filtering and
extracting each major high-level waste contaminant from the tank waste.
Furthermore, the waste separation process involves designing, building,
and operating one-of-a-kind separations processes and facilities at
Hanford. 64 Currently, the DOE is approximately five years from
completion of its comprehensive waste treatment plant, which will
contain a pre-treatment waste separations component and both low-level
65
and high-level vitrification facilities.
However, of greater concern than the complexity of the process
itself is the fact that officials at Hanford are basing their accelerated
cleanup initiative on separation technologies that will be untested prior
to implementation. In order to save time and to avoid the expenses
associated with building testing facilities, DOE managers at Hanford
decided to forego these preliminary steps and invest millions of dollars
66
in untested and unproven waste-separating technologies. Developers
and contractors of the new Hanford facilities have identified numerous
technical uncertainties and have requested that the DOE take
60. Id.
61. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 271 F. Supp. 2d. 1260 (D. Idaho 2003).
62. Id.
63. Shawn Terry, DOE Seeks Nuclear Waste Clarification to Reaffirm HLW Disposal
Strategy, 28 NUCLEAR FUEL 14 (2003).
64. U.S. GEN. AcCT. OFF., supra note 23.
65. Telephone Interview with Mike Wilson, supra note 37.
66. U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., supra note 23.
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appropriate measures to address these issues. For example, in response
to concerns about potential operational problems with the waste
separation process, in April 2002, Hanford's construction contractor
proposed building a pilot facility to perform integrated tests prior to
completion of the full-scale facilities. 67 The estimated cost of the pilot test
facility was $6-$12 million. 68 Furthermore, experts from the National
Research Council and a variety of research organizations, universities,
and private institutions uniformly held that performing integrated
testing specific to Hanford was an essential preliminary step for the
DOE. However, the DOE's Office of River Protection ignored these
recommendations and instead opted to accept the higher-risk approach.
In fact, the DOE does not plan to fully test the process until the new,
fully-operational facilities are constructed. A June 2003 GAO report on
the DOE warned of the potential consequences of such action, noting, "if
separation processes at Hanford do not work as planned, facilities will
have to be retrofitted, and potential cost increases and schedule delays
can be much greater than those associated with integrated process
testing in a pilot facility." 69
The decision to forego testing is especially ironic when
considering that the DOE's Performance Management Plan explicitly states
that the DOE aims to achieve accelerated remediation in part through
"making new front-end investments." 70 However, when presented
with
the opportunity to make a relatively small front-end investment- small
in comparison with the costs of retroactively fixing a flawed operations
process -the DOE declined.
The DOE's lack of concern for the risks associated with its waste
treatment program is particularly alarming considering that the DOE has
had to significantly alter, and in some cases abandon, past projects based
on unproven technologies. For example, the DOE invested $500 million
over nearly 15 years to develop a similar waste separations process for
its Savannah River site, located in South Carolina.71 However, due to
inadequate testing, unforeseen complications arose, leading to significant
cost increases, schedule delays, a full-scale facility that did not work, and
a sub-par waste treatment operation with no viable separation process. 72
Savannah River is currently taking steps to correct these errors and
implement new waste separation technologies at an additional cost of
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.

70.

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 1.

71.
72.

U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., supra note 23.
Id.
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$1.8 billion and a delay of nearly seven years. Despite such examples,
DOE officials at Hanford are currently following the same risk-plagued
path taken at Savannah River.

IX. CLEANUP RISKS
Due to the nature of the Hanford cleanup, there are undoubtedly
numerous risks to worker health associated with remediation. However,
these risks have been exacerbated by new safety standards adopted in
conjunction with the DOE's accelerated cleanup initiative. According to
the Government Accountability Project (GAP), which advocates on
behalf of many Hanford employees, since the implementation of the
accelerated cleanup initiative, GAP has represented over 100 cases of
worker safety complaints. 74 Thus, while the cleanup of environmental
contamination is inherently a "dirty job," the past six to eight months
have seen worker health-related incidents skyrocket at an alarming
rate. 75
Since remediation practices began in 1987, there have been a
variety of reports of personal safety risks to Hanford workers. Over the
years, one of the greatest and most publicized risks to worker safety has
been the possibility of explosion resulting from the buildup of highly
76
flammable hydrogen gas within the underground storage tanks.
Although none of the 177 tanks has technically exploded, there have
been a series of reports describing fluctuations in tank size, gas releases
of severe intensity, and compromising of the structural integrity of
several containers. 7 In an attempt to reduce risk associated with tank
wastes, the DOE has implemented several strategies to help improve
both worker and environmental safety, such as the installation of a
mixing pump in one of the storage tanks in 1993 and the installation of
ventilation systems to prevent the buildup of hydrogen and other gases
in the tanks. 78 In addition, between Fiscal Year 1999 and Fiscal Year 2001,

73.

U.S. GEN. Acr.

OFF., NUCLEAR WASTE: PROCESS TO REMOVE RADIOACTIVE WASTE

FROM SAVANNAH RIVER TANKS FAILS TO WORK, GAO/ RCED-99-69 (Apr. 30,1999).
74. Telephone Interview with Clare Gilbert, Policy Associate, Gov't Accountability
Project (Dec. 29, 2003).
75. Gov't Accountability Project, Knowing Endangerment: Worker Exposure to Toxic
Vapors at the Hanford Tank Farms (Sept. 2003).
76. Id.
77. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, DOE to Investigate Rise in Surface Level of
Hanford Waste Tank (Mar. 24, 1998), available at http://www.hanford.gov/press/1998/98017.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); Waste Tank Summary Report, supra note 22.
78. Press Release, supra note 77.
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the DOE's Office of River Protection reported the deployment of 22
separate technologies relevant to tank waste management. 79
Although officials at Hanford believe that the risk of tank
explosion has been adequately addressed, officials at GAP report that
current DOE practices and oversight deficiencies have in fact allowed
this threat to persist. 80 For example, one tank containing wastes in the BY
Tank Farm81 was recently classified as inactive and placed on standby
with its vents closed, despite the fact that the vents work to prevent
buildup of gases such as hydrogen. 82 Workers were sent to open the tank
two to three weeks later and were overcome by severe gas releases that
had built up in the unventilated tank, causing the hospitalization of
several workers. 83 According to officials at GAP, such instances at
Hanford are becoming the norm, not the exception. 84
While the threat of tank explosion was one of the most
prominent threats to worker safety in the early 1990s, currently the
biggest threat to worker safety at Hanford is exposure to toxic vapors.
According to GAP's September 2003 report, Knowing Endangerment:
Worker Exposure to Toxic Vapors at the Hanford Tank Farms, between
January 2002 and August 2003 there were at least 45 documented
chemical vapor exposure incidents involving over 67 workers requiring
medical attention (as well as an additional 75 complaints caused by tank
vapors). 85 This is in sharp contrast with the 16 exposure events requiring
medical attention that occurred in the first 55 months of remediation
(from July 1987 to January 1992), and amounts to a 750 percent increase
in the rate of significant chemical exposures. 86
The health effects resulting from exposure to these tank vapors
include nosebleeds, persistent headaches, tearing eyes, burning skin and
lungs, coughing, difficulty breathing, sore throats, dizziness, nausea, and
increased heart rate.87 However, the most serious health impacts are
more long term in nature. A 1997 draft report conducted by the DOE's
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) assessed the risk of

79.
OFFICE OF RIVER PROTECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, FY 2002 INTEGRATED
TECHNOLOGY PLAN FOR THE RIVER PROTECTION PROJECT (Feb. 1, 2002).

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Telephone Interview with Claire Gilbert, supra note 74.
One of Hanford's 18 tank farms.
Telephone Interview with Claire Gilbert, supra note 74.
Id.
Gov't Accountability Project, supra note 75.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7.
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contracting cancer from exposure to these chemical vapors to be as high
as 1.6 in ten.8
The positive correlation between this drastic increase in worker
exposure to tank vapors and the implementation of the DOE's
accelerated remediation plan is particularly alarming, considering that
the most important objective to the DOE, as stated in its Performance
89
Management Plan, is the protection of human health. However,
according to officials at GAP, the problem of increased worker exposures
is not simply the result of a series of isolated events; it is the result of a
larger, institutional problem, beginning with how the DOE addresses its
cleanup requirements. 90 With the adoption of its new accelerated cleanup
initiative emphasizing a faster, cheaper cleanup, the DOE has adopted
the de facto policy of expediency over worker safety. Furthermore, by
providing financial incentives for contractors to meet deadlines, the DOE
is prioritizing project completion over both worker and environmental
safety. For example, recently GAP has received numerous complaints
regarding safety risks to workers for Washington Group International
(WGI) - a subcontractor of Bechtel National, Inc. - involved in the design
91
and construction of Hanford's new Waste Treatment Plant. Employees
at Hanford have reported that WGI's construction workers are digging
and building within the highly contaminated Tank Farm regions,
92
without proper protective gear required for workers in these areas. Due
to a lack of effective safety protocols and enforcement mechanisms, there
is nothing to ensure that a contractor will not place unqualified and
unprotected workers in dangerous situations in order to meet its
deadlines.
Such safety risks are able to occur because of actions the DOE
has taken to ease its safety standards in favor of speed and cost reduction
under its accelerated plan. While this increase in worker injuries and
chemical exposures should lead the DOE to implement more stringent
safety standards, it appears to have had the opposite effect. On October
27, 2003, the DOE removed its existing oversight and safety procedures
and replaced them with a new Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)
protocol. 93 While the DOE claims its new protocol promotes worker
safety, in practice, DSA further reduces the number of administrative
controls and safety regulations in place, effectively removing the "red
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
DEP'T OF ENERGY, supranote 1.
Gov't Accountability Project, supranote 75.
Telephone Interview with Claire Gilbert, supra note 74.
Id.
Id.

U.S.
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tape" (safety regulations) that make it more difficult for contractors to
meet deadlines and receive their bonuses. 94
A second complaint regarding the DOE's employment practices
at Hanford is that there is no effective external oversight of worker
safety. While most companies are subject to the oversight and
enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), this agency has no jurisdiction at Hanford (or at any other DOE
sites).95 The DOE is in charge of overseeing its own practices, ensuring
the safety of workers at its own sites, and self-reporting its on-site
worker injuries. 96 Periodically the DOE invites OSHA to inspect parts of
its operations at Hanford as part of OSHA's Voluntary Protection
Program; however, the DOE and its contractors are not subject to
97
OSHA's enforcement authority.
One particularly unfortunate consequence of the DOE's selfregulation is that it produces misleading worker injury statistics. In spite
of the 45 documented exposures causing 67 workers to seek medical
attention, the DOE's official worker injury rates remain far below the
national average, with only 1.6 cases per 100 full-time-equivalent work
years in 2002,98 in comparison with a rate of 5.3 for private industry. 99
According to officials at GAP, however, these statistics are misleading, as
they do not account for workers whose sicknesses may not surface for
many years (e.g., cancer)1 °° Furthermore, the statistics only account for
cases reported by the DOE itself and evaluated by the on-site Hanford
Environmental Health Foundation (HEHF). GAP officials argue that
HEHF management has contributed to skewing the statistics through
such practices as:
* Dismissing chemical vapor related
imagined or the result of allergies;

symptoms

as

* Designing policies of automatic referral to a mental
health counselor for a host of questionable reasons;
* Shredding and altering patients' progress notes;

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Gov't Accountability Project, supra note 75.
Id.
Memorandum, supra note 43.
Id.

99. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INCIDENcE RATES OF NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES BY INDUSTRY AND CASE TYPES, 2002 (Dec. 18,

2003), available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/ostb1244.pdf (last visited Apr.
23, 2004).
100. Gov't Accountability Project, supra note 75.
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e Pressuring HEHF health care providers to not write
"recordable medical restrictions" for workers;

e Prohibiting patients from having a union steward,
friend, or family member accompany them during medical
visits.101
Additionally, GAP has received complaints that workers who
raise concerns and insist on protecting themselves from chemical vapors
are denied overtime work, which can comprise over 30 percent of a tank
farm worker's annual income. 10 2 GAP has received reports that these
workers have been subject to retaliation, harassment, and taunting by
their peers and supervisors, creating3 an atmosphere that discourages
10
other workers from raising concerns.
As a result of such instances, and the overall failure of the DOE
to address safety concerns internally, a movement is currently underway
to bring DOE contractors under the direct authority of OSHA. By
establishing external oversight and enforcement, workers at DOE sites
would at the very least be afforded the same level of safety standards as
private sector workers. Studies have been conducted examining how
10 5
OSHA oversight could be expanded,1 4 pilot projects have been tested,
and bills have been introduced in Congress to address the oversight
issue. 10 6 Most recently, in the first session of the 108th Congress,
Representative Costello of Illinois introduced House Report 1961,
providing for the external regulation of nuclear safety and occupational
safety and health at the Department of Energy. 10 7 This bill calls for the
elimination of DOE regulatory and enforcement authority at nonmilitary
sites such Hanford and grants the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
OSHA safety and health regulatory enforcement.

101.
102.
103.

Id. at 2. This list is nearly identical but is not quoted verbatim.
Id.
Id.

OFF., UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR EXTERNAL REGULATION OF WORKER
U.S. GEN. Acr.
104.
AND NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY, GAO/T-RCED-99-269 (July 22, 1999); ALFRED ZUCK ET AL.,
NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN, ENSURING WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH ACROSS THE DOE

COMPLEX (Jan. 1997).
105. Memorandum, supra note 43.
106. Id.
107. An act to provide for the external regulation of nuclear safety and occupational
safety and health at the Department of Energy, H.R. REP. 1961, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003)
(introduced by Rep. Jerry Costello (D-Ill.)).
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X. COSTS OF REMEDIATION
From the outset, the institution and operation of the Hanford site
was a national project, aimed at providing collective benefits to the entire
country through the establishment of a nuclear defense arsenal.
Throughout its construction and nearly 50 years of operation, the
Hanford site received complete federal funding and was overseen by the
DOE.10 8 Today, with the focus of the facility having switched from
plutonium production to extensive cleanup and remediation, the federal
government is still responsible for bearing the entirety of the monetary
burden.
Although the figures continue to fluctuate from year to year,
complete remediation costs are currently estimated at $50 to $60
billion, 10 9 with the Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) project
accounting for $30 billion alone. 110 Over the past several years, the costs
of remediation for the Hanford site have steadily increased; in 1998, the
DOE received $1.07 billion for cleanup programs at Hanford, compared
with $1.78 billion in 2002 and $1.95 billion in 2003.111 With such soaring
costs, the annual process of allocating funds for the site's cleanup is
naturally a very complex and hotly contested issue. While the DOE
submits a budget in accordance with what it deems as necessary for the
fulfillment of its cleanup requirements under the TPA, the amount of
money allocated to the DOE by Congress is often much less than
requested. This disparity in funding has widespread implications, often
making it difficult, if not impossible, for the DOE to meet its established
milestones. For example, while the $1.78 billion allotment for 2002 was
an increase of $320 million over the previous year, it still fell $56 million
short of what DOE calculations indicate was necessary to meet its legal
cleanup obligations. 112 As a result, each of the DOE's divisions
responsible for specific cleanup procedures was expected to achieve the
same level of remediation with less funding than was reportedly needed.
While the costs of the Hanford cleanup continue to increase,
President Bush has repeatedly pushed to reduce federal funding for the
project. Faced with growing public dissatisfaction with project
inefficiency and spiraling costs, Bush's 2002 budget proposal called for a

108. Telephone Interview with Robert Budnitz, Chairman, Nat'l Academy of Sci.
Comm. on Buried & Tank Waste (1993-1997) (May 15, 2002).
109.

U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1.

110.
111.
112.

Id.
Memorandum, supra note 43.
Id.
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$435 million cut for Hanford spending. 113 This attack on Hanford
funding met with harsh criticism from numerous members of Congress,
especially Washington Senator, and member of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, Patty Murray. Senator Murray immediately
organized a bi-partisan nuclear cleanup caucus (comprised primarily of
other states housing nuclear storage facilities) and was able to counter
President Bush's cuts and force a reinstitution of the $435 million into the
federal budget.11 4 Nevertheless, in the face of continued criticism and
project delays, President Bush's 2003 budget proposal again cut Hanford
funding (this time calling for a $300 million reduction), in hopes of
encouraging the TPA to accelerate and increase the efficiency of the
Hanford cleanup process.11 5 However, with Senator Murray's help, the
Senate rejected the proposed cut and added an additional $433 million to
16
the Hanford budget
Following this series of intense budget wrangling from 2000 to
2003, in Fiscal Year 2004 the funding arrangement for Hanford
underwent significant changes. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2004, the Bush
Administration requested an entirely new account structure to support
the DOE's accelerated cleanup initiative. This proposal called for the
creation of a new Defense Site Acceleration Completion Account from
which Hanford funding would be provided, replacing the existing
7
Defense Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Account.11
As passed by the House and Senate, the conference agreement on the
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004
would provide $5.65 billion for this new account, which is nearly $164
million less than the requested $5.81 billion. While the administration
requested over $2.0 billion for Hanford in Fiscal Year 2004, the
conference report language does not specify whether or not Hanford's
funding will be cut as a result of the overall reduced appropriations for
the Defense Site Acceleration Completion Account. 118

113. Telephone Interview with Todd Webster, Press Secretary for Sen. Patty Murray
(May 24, 2002).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Memorandum, supra note 43.
118. Id.

Summer 20041

HANFORD NUCLEAR WASTE SITE

XI. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
HANFORD CLEANUP
One of the most frustrating realities for policy makers involved
in the Hanford cleanup is that it is the most expensive,11 9 and arguably
the least efficient, project ever conducted by the DOE. At a current cost
of over $2 billion a year, and likely to take at least another 20 years to
complete, the Hanford remediation has been and, barring a miracle, will
continue to be, an excessive drain on Congress's checkbook. While a
number of factors contribute to this problem, the principal cause is a
conflict of motivation between those who bear the costs and those who
bear the risks associated with remediation.
The primary bearers of risk in the Hanford cleanup are the
members of the local population in and around the cities of Kennewick,
Pasco, and Richland. It is the workers from these communities that are
employed at the Hanford site and who have the greatest potential
exposure to chemicals and radiation. Additionally, if the Columbia River
were to become contaminated, the local citizenry would be forced to
suffer both the health and environmental consequences that would
ensue. However, though the local populace is clearly at the greatest risk,
the community has a distinct lack of desire to expedite the cleanup
process. A potential explanation of this apparent divergence from
rational thought has been posited by Robert Budnitz, the chairman of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) former Committee on Buried and
Tank Waste (1993-1998). According to Dr. Budnitz, because the dangers
accompanying the site are not clear and present, the local citizens feel
little pressure to push for immediate cleanup; since nobody can see the
direct effects of contamination on the community, the citizens feel little
pressure to combat the problem quickly. 120 In other words, if not enough
people are getting sick today as a result of contamination, the local
community sees little reason why it matters if the site is cleaned up in
three years or thirty years.121
While the people living near Hanford undoubtedly want to see
site remediation, the lack of an immediate tangible threat assigns the risk
of contamination a lower priority than that of other issues concerning the
community. Thus, the decision of whether to expedite or to prolong the
cleanup effort flows from a simple evaluation of individual costs and
benefits. Prior to the cessation of plutonium production in 1987, Hanford
119. U.S. DEl'T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 10.
120. Telephone Interview with Robert Budnitz, supra note 108.
121. The problems associated with DOE's worker injury reports (discussed in Part IX
supra) likely contribute to the local citizenry's lack of a sense of urgency.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

employed approximately 8000 workers; in contrast, there are currently
over 11,000 employees working on the cleanup effort.22 In an area that
has grown alongside Hanford, and has been economically dependent
upon it since the beginning of World War II, the shutdown of the facility
and completion of the cleanup will certainly bring economic downfall for
the surrounding communities. While the remediation efforts are taking
place, not only have local communities survived, but they have actually
thrived with the cleanup project's creation of over 3000 new jobs.
Without any clear and present danger posed by the site, the finite costs
associated with the completion of Hanford's cleanup far outweigh the
seemingly intangible benefits of remediation. 123
Though the local communities' incentives for prolonging the
cleanup efforts are understandable, they stand in direct conflict with the
remediation goals of the federal government. Distinct from the objectives
of the local citizenry, Congress's primary aim is to complete the
remediation of the Hanford site in both an expedient and cost-effective
manner. While safety is publicly stated to be the most important aspect
of the Hanford cleanup, Congress also has a strong incentive to reduce
the number of yearly billion dollar checks it hands out to the DOE. Thus,
from a congressional standpoint, the goal of the federal government is to
strike an appropriate balance between the reduction of risk at Hanford
and the most economically reasonable remediation plan. However,
because of the local economic benefits that accompany a prolonged
remediation, coupled with the federal government's bearing of the entire
monetary burden for the project, the local government has the incentive
to manipulate the availability of federal funding. Thus, while Congress is
working with limited resources, making its decisions based on costbenefit analysis, local governments make their decisions under the
assumption of infinite resources. With remediation efforts being paid for
with federal funds, the policies that the local government considers to be
cost-effective for the community -essentially everything-are often
inconsistent with the balance Congress is attempting to strike.
In accordance with this logic, much of the inefficiency that
shrouds the Hanford cleanup is a result of the local community's attempt
to take advantage of the available federal remediation funds. For
example, Congress's primary goal for the Hanford site cleanup is to
reduce risks to both people and the environment. However, the local
community ideally would like to see the site completely uncontaminated, free of Hanford's footprint (an economically enormous, if not

122.
123.

Telephone Interview with Robert Budnitz, supra note 108.
Id.
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impossible, task). In the absence of economic responsibility, the only
choice the local government has to make is, "Would we prefer to have
the site restored to prior greenfield status,124 or have large portions of the
reservation fenced-off and unusable?" In contrast, Congress, working
with limited resources, has to decide what degree of remediation
provides the correct balance between reducing risks to human health
and the environment and the economic costs of these reductions. From a
congressional standpoint, clearly the economic burden of returning
Hanford to greenfield status far outweighs the overall benefits. 12
In addition to its attempts to restore Hanford to prior greenfield
status, the local population has employed the issue of worker safety as a
means for prolonging the cleanup efforts. 126 While the local government
idealistically pushes for a zero marker in worker exposure, 127 Congress
again turns to cost-benefit analysis to find the level of policy
implementation that adequately balances worker protection with
economic feasibility. However, because the issue at hand deals with
personal health risk, as opposed to land use, the local community has
achieved a greater level of success in receiving sympathy in the form of
federal funds. While the reasoning behind conducting these studies is
valid - the local community is worried about its citizens' exposure to
risk-in practice, they have added to the overall inefficiency of the
Hanford cleanup. In order to ensure the highest degree of personal
safety, the local community has insisted that the federal government
conduct repeated studies of all cleanup procedures used and has
questioned all aspects of DOE decisions.128 In doing so, the local
government is ensuring that cleanup measures will come as close to the
desired zero standard policy as possible, while at the same time adding a
hitch to the remediation process, resulting in long delays and higher
costs. 129 For example, while certain aspects of the DOE's waste
separations plan 30 justly deserve further scrutiny and deliberation, the
local citizenry has worked to impede the DOE's progress at nearly every
step. In its desire to restore Hanford to prior greenfield status, the local
citizenry is ignoring the billions of dollars saved and years of
remediation reduced by the DOE's plan to store some low-level wastes
124. Greenfield status refers to land not previously developed beyond that of
agriculture or forestry use.
125. DOE currently plans to restore approximately 511 acres, or over 85 percent of the
Hanford site.
126. Telephone Interview with Robert Budnitz, supra note 108.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Part VIII supra.
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on site. 131 Concern about unsafe storage practices is valid, but a blanket
refusal to accept any on-site storage of low-level wastes simply
contributes to the overall inefficiency of the cleanup project.
Working with limited resources, and with annual cleanup costs
for Hanford now exceeding $2 billion, it seems logical that Congress
would be very concerned with the current level of project inefficiency.
However, due to internal politicking and congressional logrolling,
Congress has, for the most part, failed to address the issue. Although
Congress is in charge of appropriating funds, the process of allocating
money for the Hanford cleanup is extremely complex, with every dollar
down to the $500,000 mark specifically assigned. To add to the
complexity of the issue, each of these specific allocation decisions is, in
turn, influenced by the individual special interests of each congressional
member. For example, when voting on whether Congress should
appropriate funds for the DOE to transport low-level hazardous wastes
from Hanford to an out-of-state facility for treatment, Members from
Idaho might ask themselves, "Why should we support this proposal?
What's in it for us?" Thus, in order to benefit from the proposal, the
representatives from Idaho might try to negotiate, promising to vote
favorably on this issue on the condition that the waste is shipped to an
Idaho treatment facility (an action that would benefit the economy and
please their constituents). 132 Unfortunately, accompanying this system of
trade-offs is often a great deal of economic inefficiency. While Idaho
might only support the proposal if the waste is shipped to its treatment
plants, perhaps sending the waste to another state would save the
133
government millions of dollars.

131. There is no one source that specifically shows that the local citizenry is directly
disregarding the costs. This is part of the Budnitz argument and is based on how the local
government and local citizenry have reacted to various DOE proposals and actions. One
source is Natural Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 271 F. Supp. 2d. 1260 (D. Idaho 2003),
in which the plaintiffs include a number of local groups such as the Snake River Alliance,
The Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation, and the Shoshone Bannock
Tribes. Also, in this case the states of Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina
participated as amicus curiae. A second source is from a leading Hanford citizen's action
group, Heart of America Northwest. This group drafted a response to the DOE's
Performance Management Plan, supra note 1, explicitly opposing the DOE's plan to
permanently store wastes on-site at Hanford, available at http://www.heartofamerica
northwest.org/reportspubs/hanfordreview.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2004). While none of
these sources explicitly states that the local citizenry is disregarding the costs, their actions
suggest that these other concerns consistently take precedent over cost-saving measures.
132. Telephone Interview with Robert Budnitz, supra note 108.
133. Coincidentally, instead of transporting all of its low-level wastes to existing
treatment sites, DOE is constructing a new on-site facility specifically tailored for wastes at
Hanford. See U.S. GEN. Acr. OFF., supra note 23.
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Additionally, Congress is also under enormous pressure to find
the proper balance between risk prevention and remediation cost-if
Congress errs in either direction, the consequences can be severe. The
nature of the threat posed by Hanford is of great concern to the general
public. If a member of Congress is portrayed as being in support of
reducing cleanup funds, the effects of such negative exposure could be
politically devastating- thus, few politicians want to take this risk. At
the other end of the spectrum, Congress is expected to allocate funds
efficiently and eliminate wasteful spending. If the public becomes
disenchanted with the Hanford cleanup effort and believes that there is a
great imbalance between the risks involved and the remediation costs,
then policy-makers risk alienating their constituents. This age-old
quandary is commonly referred to in environmental circles as the "man
from Maine" dilemma. 34 The question raised in this scenario is "Why
would the man from Maine-who has no direct personal risk of
contamination- appropriate his tax dollars to fix something at
Hanford?" The simple answer to this question is that the man from
Maine benefited from the Hanford site (in the sense that the nation
collectively benefited), and, as a result, he feels a sense of financial
responsibility for remediation. However, the man from Maine-the
skeptical appropriator of funds-ceases to feel a sense of responsibility
when the remedy being sought costs far more than the real objective risk.
As a result, members of Congress must find an acceptable balance and
make appropriations decisions that avoid the risk of being portrayed as
tight-fisted or an excessive spender.
XII. CONCLUSION
After nearly a half century of waste management procedures
that threatened both personal and environmental safety, the federal
government is now faced with a cleanup task more complex than any
other remediation project in environmental history. Not only are wastes
that were dumped directly into the soil permeating the ground water,
but also over one-third of Hanford's storage tanks are leaking, adding to
the flow of radioactive substances into the ground water. The risks
associated with exposure to these wastes are substantial; the effects of
the Columbia River's contamination would not only be devastating to
the local community, but would also impact all who live downstream
and who depend on the Columbia for their livelihood.

134.

Consequently, DOE has no sites in Maine.
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The DOE has taken steps to address these risks in an accelerated
fashion but has done so at the expense of the environment and worker
health. Improved safety protocols are necessary for the DOE to achieve a
safe and effective remediation, and DOE practices over the past six to
eight months have made it clear that external oversight and enforcement
is needed. Furthermore, to avoid costly mistakes in the future, the DOE
needs to place more emphasis on the planning and testing of its waste
separations processes prior to construction of treatment facilities.
In the face of these risks, Congress and the local government
have often been at odds in regard to goals for remediation. While the
federal government wants to ensure the safety of workers and the local
citizenry, it also has to counter the challenges and criticism made by
those who have to help bear Hanford's cleanup costs. At the same time,
the local government is pushing to increase the extent of remediation
beyond what is economically feasible for Congress. With so much of the
local economy tied up in the remediation effort, the local government
has a strong incentive to prolong the cleanup procedure.
The Hanford cleanup project has become a platform for
congressional logrolling. Even though the local government and
Congress are locked in dispute, they must both counter the influence of
special interest groups trying to benefit personally from the cleanup.
Diminishing the influence of special interest groups will help to avoid
increasing the difficulty of an already complex situation. In the
upcoming year, with a new and increased budget from the federal
government, the TPA stands ready to fulfill its end of the bargain.
However, it remains to be seen whether this increase in funding will
result in a safer and more efficient cleanup, or a more costly and
prolonged remediation.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1: Location of the Hanford Site

k-ailxui 5kv-- L-laweCa M'ap

Source: U.S. Dep't of Energy: Hanford Site. Hanford Tours: Get to Know
Us, availableat http://www.hanford.gov/tours/index.cfm.
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Figure 2: The Hanford Site

Source: U.S. Department of Energy: Hanford Site, Hanford Tours: Get to
Know Us, available at http://www.hanford.gov/tours/index.cfm.
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Figure 3: Diagram of a Typical Storage Tank
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Table 1: Hanford Performance Management Plan Acceleration Goals*
Cleanup Activity

Current Plan

Acceleration

lan
Plan

Complete cleanup
Start tank closure
Initiate Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP)
plutonium deinventory
Establish the site-wide Integrated
Groundwater Protection Program
Complete first tank waste retrieval and
closure demonstration
Demonstrate supplemental tank waste
technologies
Complete PFP plutonium deinventory
Retrieve, assay, and disposition 15,000
drums of buried suspect transonic waste
Complete removal of K Basin spent
nuclear fuel, sludge, debris, and water
Move cesium and strontium capsules
into try storage
Treat 14,000 cubic meters of mixed lowlevel waste
Demolish PFP
Achieve Waste Treatment Plant full
performance
Complete U Plan regional closure
Initiate shipments of cesium/strontium
capsules to national geologic repository
Complete River Corridor cleanup
Complete remediation of high-risk waste
sitese
Disposition all contact-handled legacy
TRUd
Complete closure of 60 to 140 singleshelled tanksh
Complete tank waste treatment
Active portion of site

2070
2012a
2009

2035 (2025?)
2002
2003

NAb

2003

2014

2004

NA

2004

2014
2010

2005
2006

2007g

2006

NA

2008c

2012

2008

2016
2018

2009
2010

2025
2040

2011
2012

2037
2012

2012e

2027

2015

2024

2018

2048 f
586 sq. miles
(1158 sq. km)

Approximate Cost

$90 billion

2028
-75 sq. miles
(194 sq. km)
by 2012
$50-$60
billion
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*U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUB. No. RL-2002-47 REV. D, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR THE ACCELERATED CLEANUP OF THE HANFORD SITE, B-2 (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.hanford.gov/docs/hpmp/index.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
, Current Tri-Party Agreement target date.
b Agencies have recently agreed to establish a new site-wide Integrated Groundwater
Protection Program.
Benefits of dry storage and disposal options to be evaluated in FY 2003.
d Remote-handled and large-item TRU will require processing through the M-91 facility.
This will occur after 2015.
e Several discrete projects in the river corridor will not be completed by 2012. The 618-10
and 618-11 burial grounds will be completed by 2018; several active facilities in the 300
Area related to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) remain operational; the
reactor cores in Interim Safe Storage are pending final disposition; ongoing groundwater
remedies. The Fast Flux Test Facility is not yet part of the EM cleanup mission and is not
included in this initiative.
f 2048 represents current DOE projection; the TPA date is 2048.
9 Current TPA milestone is July 31, 2007.
h The number of tanks depicted here represents a DOE goal and does not represent
agreement with the Washington State Department of Ecology.

